Progressive knowledge revealed preferences and sequential rationalizability by Houy, Nicolas
Progressive knowledge revealed preferences and
sequential rationalizability
Nicolas Houy
To cite this version:
Nicolas Houy. Progressive knowledge revealed preferences and sequential rationalizability.
cahier de recherche 2008-36. 2008. <hal-00360546>
HAL Id: hal-00360546
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00360546
Submitted on 11 Feb 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
PROGRESSIVE KNOWLEDGE REVEALED PREFERENCES
AND SEQUENTIAL RATIONALIZABILITY 
 
 
Nicolas HOUY 
 
 
 
December 2008 
 
 
Cahier n° 2008-36 
 
 
 
                              ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE                      
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 
 
 
DEPARTEMENT D'ECONOMIE 
Route de Saclay 
91128 PALAISEAU CEDEX 
(33) 1 69333033 
http://www.enseignement.polytechnique.fr/economie/  
mailto:chantal.poujouly@polytechnique.edu 
 
 
  
PROGRESSIVE KNOWLEDGE REVEALED PREFERENCES 
AND SEQUENTIAL RATIONALIZABILITY 
 
 
 
Nicolas HOUY1 
 
 
 
December 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cahier n° 2008-36 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: In this paper, we study the link between choices derived from monotonous set-dependent 
preferences and sequential rationalizability. This link is quite natural since choices derived 
from monotonous set-dependent preferences (introduced in [Houy, 2008b]) are characterized 
by a strong axiom of revealed preferences whereas sequentially rationalizable choice 
functions (introduced in [Manzini and Mariotti, 2007]) are characterized by a weak axiom of 
revealed preferences. 
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1 Introduction
Classical rational choice theory is based on the axiom of revealed prefer-
ences. In short, we say that an individual reveals that he prefers an alterna-
tive a to an alternative b if there exists a choice set S such that b is in S and a
is chosen from S. One of the most important results of classical choice theory
is that a choice function is rationalized by a linear order if and only if the
revealed preferences derived from it are asymmetric (weak axiom of revealed
preferences, introduced by [Samuelson, 1938]). Moreover, in this framework,
the asymmetry of the reavealed preferences is equivalent to their acyclicity
(strong axiom of revealed preferences, introduced by [Houthakker, 1950]).
However, many experiments tend to show that the traditional rational
choice theory is violated by most of individuals (see [Loomes et al., 1991],
[Roelofsma et Read, 2000] and [Tversky, 1969] for instance). Then, in or-
der to study the choice patterns of the observed individuals, one need to
weaken the axioms and equivalently representations in the theory of rational
choices. A few recent articles have studied rational choices in this line of
analysis. First, [Manzini and Mariotti, 2007] studied sequentially rationaliz-
able choice functions.1 In order to characterize those choice functions, an
weak axiom of revealed preferences is used. This axiom still requires the
revealed preferences to be asymmetric but it defines a revealed preference
as follows: a is said to be revealed preferred to b if there exist two sets S
and S ′ such that a, b ∈ S ⊆ S ′ and such that b is chosen in S whereas a
is chosen in S ′. A second approach has been studied by [Tyson, 2008] and
[Houyb, 2008a]. In those study, the authors weaken the representation by
remarking that traditional choice theory corresponds to some choice set in-
1For more studies in this line, see [Ballester and Apesteguia, 2008], [Houy, 2007],
[Houy and Tadenuma, 2007] and [Tadenuma, 2002].
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dependent preferences. Obviously, just considering that preferences could
be choice set dependent would not be binding since any choice function can
be rationalized by choice set dependent preferences. Hence, the authors
set some structure on the dependence of the preferences on the choice set.
[Tyson, 2008] considers a nested structure whereas [Houyb, 2008a] consid-
ers an anti-nested structure. In [Houy, 2008b], a monotonous structure is
imposed and it is shown that then, the choice functions obtained are char-
caterized by the strong axiom of revealed preferences applied to the revealed
preferences introduced in [Manzini and Mariotti, 2007]. Hence, even though
the results and representation are very different, there is a close relation be-
tween [Manzini and Mariotti, 2007] and [Houy, 2008b]. In this article, we
study these relations.
2 Formal framework
Let X be a finite set of alternatives. Let X be the set of non-empty
subsets of X, X = 2X \ ∅. A choice function is a function C : X → X such
that ∀S ∈ X , C(S) ⊆ S and #C(S) = 1.
Let S ∈ X . A binary relation on S is a subset of S×S. A binary relation
P ⊆ S × S is asymmetric if ∀a, b ∈ S with a 6= b, (a, b) ∈ P ⇒ (b, a) /∈ P . It
is complete if ∀a, b ∈ S with a 6= b, (a, b) ∈ P or (b, a) ∈ P . It is transitive
if ∀a, b, c ∈ S, (a, b), (b, c) ∈ P ⇒ (a, c) ∈ P . It is acyclic if ∀n ∈ N \ {1},
∀a1, ..., an ∈ S, (ai, ai+1) ∈ P for all i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} implies a1 6= an. A
preference relation is an asymmetric binary relation. A linear order is an
asymmetric, transitive and complete binary relation. For a set S ∈ X and
a binary relation P , we write M(S, P ) = {a ∈ S, ∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P} and
J(S, P ) = {a ∈ S, ∀b ∈ S, (a, b) ∈ P}.
pi : X → 2X×X is a binary relation (resp. preference relation, linear
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order) function if for all S ∈ X , pi(S) is a binary relation (resp. preference
relation, linear order) on S. We say that pi is monotonous if ∀S, S ′, S ′′ ∈ X
such that S ⊆ S ′ ⊆ S ′′, ∀a, b ∈ S, [(a, b) ∈ pi(S) ∩ pi(S ′′) ⇒ (a, b) ∈ pi(S ′)]
and [(a, b) /∈ pi(S) ∪ pi(S ′′) ⇒ (a, b) /∈ pi(S ′)]. We say that pi is expansive
if ∀S, S ′ ∈ X , ∀a ∈ S ∩ S ′, [∀b ∈ S ∪ S ′, (b, a) /∈ pi(S) ∪ pi(S ′) ⇒ ∀b ∈
S ∪ S ′, (b, a) /∈ pi(S ∪ S ′)].
Let pi be a binary relation function. A choice function C is rationalized
by pi if ∀S ∈ X , C(S) = M(S, pi(S)). A choice function C is justified by
pi if ∀S ∈ X , C(S) = J(S, pi(S)). Finally, if C is a choice function and
P1, P2 ⊆ X × X are two binary relations, we say that C is sequentially
rationalized (S-rationalized) by the ordered pair (P1, P2) if ∀S ∈ X , C(S) =
M(M(S, P1), P2).
The main difference between our study and classical rational choice theory
lies in the next definition. As we said in the Introduction, we consider cases
where there can be preference reversals. However, in our study, we will
consider only "one way" reversals. Hence, it is not because we observe that
the individual chooses an alternative a whereas a second alternative b is
available that we can deduce that the individual intrinsicly prefers a to b. It
could be the case that the individual lacks information from the choice set.
Then, in order to assess that the individual intrinsicly prefers a to b, it must
be the case that the individual chooses b rather than a in a set S and b rather
than a in a larger set (with respect to inclusion) S ′. The main assumption of
this paper is that then, there will not be any set S ′′ such that S ′ is included
in S ′′ and such that individual chooses b again from it. In some sense, the
information the individual gets from the choice set is progressive and makes
the preferences of the individual closer to some "fundamental" preferences.
Then, for a choice function C, we define the progressive knowledge revealed
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preferences binary relation on X, P r
C
, by: ∀a, b ∈ X, (a, b) ∈ P r
C
if and only
if ∃S, S ′ ∈ X such that a, b ∈ S ⊆ S ′, {b} = C(S) and {a} = C(S ′).
The first two axioms are statements of the usual weak and strong axioms
of revealed preferences in the case of progressive knowledge revealed prefer-
ences. PKSARP imposes the acyclicity of P r
C
whereas PKWARP imposes its
asymmetry. Obviously PKSARP is stronger than PKWARP.
Axiom 1 (PKWARP, Progressive Knowledge WARP)
A choice function C satisfies Progressive Knowledge WARP if P r
C
is asym-
metric.
Axiom 2 (PKSARP, Progressive Knowledge SARP)
A choice function C satisfies Progressive Knowledge SARP if P r
C
is acyclic.
The next axiom is the usual Expansion Consistency Axiom. It is some-
times referred to as Axiom γ.
Axiom 3 (Expansion)
A choice function C satisfies Expansion if ∀S, S ′ ∈ X and ∀a ∈ X, a ∈
C(S) ∩ C(S ′) ⇒ a ∈ C(S ∪ S ′).
3 Results
Theorem 1 has been given in [Houy, 2008b] and characterizes the choice
functions satisfying PKSARP as being the only ones rationalized by monotonous
linear order functions.
Theorem 1 (Houy)
Let C be a choice function. C satisfies PKSARP if and only if it is rational-
ized by some monotonous linear order function.
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Theorem 2 has been given in [Manzini and Mariotti, 2007] and charac-
terizes the choice functions satisfying PKWARP and Expansion as being the
only ones S-rationalized by pairs of preference relations.
Theorem 2 ([Manzini and Mariotti, 2007])
Let C be a choice function. C satisfies PKWARP and Expansion if and only
if it is S-rationalized by some pair of preference relations (P1, P2).
Even though the two previous theorems use similar concepts, it seems that
the choice functions they characterize have very different representations in
terms of preferences. In the following, we study the relationships between
the previous theorems and combine the different axioms needed for them.
First, Theorem 3 shows that if we weaken PKSARP to PKWARP in
Theorem 1, rationalization is not the right concept to use. Justification is
better adapted. The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 3
Let C be a choice function. C satisfies PKWARP if and only if it is justified
by some monotonous preference relation function.
In Appendix C, an example is given that shows that Theorems 1 and 3
are not redundant, that is that PKWARP does not imply PKSARP.
The next two theorems characterize the choice functions that satisfy
PKWARP/PKSARP and Expansion. The proofs are quite straightforward
and omitted.
Theorem 4
Let C be a choice function. C satisfies PKWARP and Expansion if and only
if it is justified by some monotonous expansive preference relation function.
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Theorem 5
Let C be a choice function. C satisfies PKSARP and Expansion if and only
if it is rationalized by some monotonous expansive linear order function.
The following example shows that Theorems 4 and 5 are not redundant
with Theorems 1 and 3. Indeed, PKWARP does not imply Expansion.
Example 1
Let X = {a, b, c}. Let C be the choice function defined by: C({a}) = {a},
C({b}) = {b}, C({c}) = {c}, C({a, b}) = {b}, C({a, c}) = {c}, C({b, c}) =
{b} and C(X) = {a}. Obviously, C satisfies PKSARP (and then PKWARP).
However, it does not satisfy Expansion since C({a, b}) = C({b, c}) = {b}
whereas C(X) = {a}.
Finally, we give a theorem showing a representation in terms of sequential
rationality for the same choice functions as the ones considered in Theorem
5.
Theorem 6
Let C be a choice function. C satisfies PKSARP and Expansion if and only
if it is S-rationalized by some pair of preference relations (P1, P2) with P2
acyclic.
In Appendix C, we show a case of a choice function that satisfies PKWARP
and Expansion but not PKWARP. This shows that theorems 2 and 6 are
not redundant. Said differently, there exist choice functions that can be
S-rationalized and such that if (P1, P2) rationalizes it, P2 is cyclic.
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A Proof of Theorem 3
A.1 Only If:
Let C be a choice function satisfying PKWARP.
Let S ∈ X . Let us define the irreflexive binary relations P1(S) and P2(S)
as follows: ∀a, b ∈ S,
• (a, b) ∈ P1(S) if and only if a 6= b and ∃S ′, S ′′ ∈ X such that a, b ∈
S ′ ⊆ S ′′ ⊆ S, {b} = C(S ′) and {a} = C(S ′′).
• (a, b) ∈ P2(S) if and only if a 6= b and [(a, b), (b, a) /∈ P1(S) and
∃S ′, S ′′ ∈ X such that a, b ∈ S ′ ⊆ S ⊆ S ′′, {a} = C(S ′) and {a} =
C(S ′′)].
Let us define the binary relation function pi as ∀S ∈ X , pi(S) = P1(S) ∪
P2(S).
I. Let us show that ∀S ∈ X , pi(S) is asymmetric.
1) P1(S) is asymmetric. Indeed, by definition, P1(S) ⊆ P1(X) = P rC .
Hence, P1(S) is asymmetric by PKWARP.
2) P2(S) is asymmetric. Assume on the contrary that P2(S) is symmetric.
Then, there exist a, b ∈ X with a 6= b such that (a, b), (b, a) ∈ P2(S). Then,
by definition, [(a, b), (b, a) /∈ P1(S) and ∃S
′
1, S
′′
1 , S
′
2, S
′′
2 ∈ X such that S
′
1 ⊆ S,
S ′2 ⊆ S, S ⊆ S
′′
1 , S ⊆ S
′′
2 , {a} = C(S
′
1), {a} = C(S
′′
1 ), {b} = C(S
′
2)
and {b} = C(S ′′2 )]. Hence, {a} = C(S
′
1) and {b} = C(S
′′
2 ) imply (b, a) ∈
P r
C
. {b} = C(S ′2) and {a} = C(S
′′
1 ) imply (a, b) ∈ P
r
C
. This contradicts
PKWARP.
3) Assume that there exist a, b ∈ X with a 6= b such that (a, b) ∈ P1(S)
and (b, a) ∈ P2(S). This cannot be by definition of P2(S).
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II. Let us show that C is justified by pi. Let S ∈ X , let {a} = C(S) and
let b ∈ S \ {a}.
1) Assume that there exists S ′ ⊆ S such that a, b ∈ S ′ and {b} = C(S ′).
Then, by definition, (a, b) ∈ P1(S) ⊆ pi(S).
2) Assume that ∀S ′ ∈ X such that a, b ∈ S ′ ⊆ S, {b} 6= C(S ′). Then, by
definition, (a, b), (b, a) /∈ P1(S). Hence, by definition, (a, b) ∈ P2(S) ⊆ pi(S).
III. Let us show that pi is monotonous.
Let S, S ′, S ′′ ∈ X be such that S ⊆ S ′ ⊆ S ′′. Let a, b ∈ S be such that
(a, b) ∈ pi(S)∩pi(S ′′). Let us show that (a, b) ∈ pi(S ′). i) Assume that (a, b) ∈
P1(S). Then, by definition, (a, b) ∈ P1(S ′) ⊆ pi(S ′). ii) Assume that (a, b) ∈
P2(S
′′). Then, there exists S1 ⊆ S ′′ such that {a} = C(S1). Moreover, by
definition, (a, b) /∈ P1(S ′′) which implies by definition, {a} = C({a, b}) and
then, ∀S2 ∈ X such that a, b ∈ S2 ⊆ S ′′, {b} 6= C(S2). Moreover, there
exists S3 ∈ X such that S3 ⊇ S ′′ and {a} = C(S3). Hence, (a, b) ∈ P2(S ′).
iii) Assume that (a, b) ∈ P1(S
′′) and (a, b) ∈ P2(S). The same proof as ii)
shows that (a, b) ∈ P2(S) implies {a} = C({a, b}). Moreover, (a, b) ∈ P1(S ′′)
implies that ∃S1, S2 ∈ X with a, b ∈ S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ S ′′ such that {b} = C(S1),
{a} = C(S2). Hence, {a} = C({a, b}) and {b} = C(S1) imply (b, a) ∈
P1(S1) ⊆ P1(S ′′). This contradicts the asymmetry of P1(S ′′). Hence, this
case cannot be.
A.2 If:
Let C be a choice function justified by pi, monotonous preference relation
function. Assume that C does not satisfy PKWARP. Let a, b ∈ X be such
that (a, b), (b, a) ∈ P r
C
. Then, there exist S1, S
′
1 ∈ X be such that a, b ∈
S1 ⊆ S ′1 with {b} = C(S1) and {a} = C(S
′
1) and there exist S2, S
′
2 ∈ X
be such that a, b ∈ S2 ⊆ S ′2 with {a} = C(S2) and {b} = C(S
′
2). Then,
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by C being justified by pi, (b, a) ∈ pi(S1), (a, b) ∈ pi(S ′1), (a, b) ∈ pi(S2),
(b, a) ∈ pi(S ′2). Hence, by monotonicity of pi, (a, b) ∈ pi(X) and (b, a) ∈ pi(X).
This contradicts the assumption that pi is a preference relation function.
B Proof of Theorem 6
Here, we prove Theorem 6 for the sake of completeness, however, our
proof is straightforward from [Manzini and Mariotti, 2007].
B.1 Only If:
Let C be a choice function satisfying PKSARP and Expansion.
Let S ∈ X . Let us define the irreflexive binary relations P1 and P2 as
follows: ∀a, b ∈ X,
• (a, b) ∈ P1 if and only if a 6= b and ∀S ∈ X a ∈ S ⇒ {b} 6= C(S).
• (a, b) ∈ P2(S) if and only if a 6= b, {a} = C({a, b}) and ∃S ∈ X , a ∈ S
and {b} = C(S).
I. Let us show that P1 and P2 are preference relations, i.e. are asymmetric.
P1 and P2 are irreflexive by definition. Let a, b ∈ S with a 6= b.
1) Let us show that P1 is asymmetric. Assume (a, b) ∈ P1. By definition,
{a} = C({a, b}). Then, by definition, (b, a) /∈ P1.
2) Let us show that P2 is asymmetric. Assume (a, b) ∈ P2. By definition,
{a} = C({a, b}). Then, by definition, (b, a) /∈ P2.
II. Let us show that P2 is acyclic. Assume on the contrary, that P2 is
cyclic. Then, there exist n ∈ N \ {1} and a1, ..., an ∈ P2 such that ∀i ∈
{1, ..., n− 1}, (ai, ai+1) ∈ P2 and a1 = an. Then, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}, {ai} =
C({ai, ai+1}) and ∃Si ∈ X , ai ∈ Si and {ai+1} = C(Si). Then, by definition,
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(ai+1, ai) ∈ P rC . Hence, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n−1}, (ai+1, ai) ∈ P
r
C
and a1 = an. Then,
P r
C
is cyclic which contradicts PKSARP.
III. Let us show that C is S-rationalized by (P1, P2). Let S ∈ X and
a ∈ S.
1) Assume that a /∈ M(M(S, P1), P2). Then, by definition, there exists
b ∈ S such that (b, a) ∈ P1 or [b ∈ M(S, P1) and (b, a) ∈ P2]. If (b, a) ∈ P1,
then, by definition, a /∈ C(S). If b ∈ M(S, P1) and (b, a) ∈ P2, then, {b} =
C({a, b}) and ∀c ∈ S \ {b}, (c, b) /∈ P1 which implies ∃Sc ∈ X such that
{b} = C(Sc). Hence, by Expansion, {b} = C(
⋃
c∈S\{b} Sc
⋃
{a}). Obviously,
⋃
c∈S\{b} Sc
⋃
{a} ⊇ S. Hence, by PKSARP, {b} = C(
⋃
c∈S\{b} Sc
⋃
{a}) and
{b} = C({a, b}) imply {a} 6= C(S).
2) Assume that a /∈ C(S) and a ∈ M(M(S, P1), P2). Let b ∈ S \ {a}
be such that C(S) = {b}. By what we showed above, b ∈ M(M(S, P1), P2).
Obviously, since by definition P1 ∪ P2 is complete, we cannot have a, b ∈
M(M(S, P1), P2).
B.2 If:
Let C be a choice function S-rationalized by some pair of preference re-
lations (P1, P2) with P2 acyclic.
By Theorem 2, C satisfies Expansion. Let us show that C satisfies
PKSARP.
Assume on the contrary that C does not satisfy PKSARP. Then, P r
C
is cyclic. Then, ∃n ∈ N \ {1}, ∃a1, ..., an ∈ X such that ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n −
1}, (ai, ai+1) ∈ P rC and an = a1. Then, by definition, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1},
∃Si, S ′i ∈ X such that ai, ai+1 ∈ Si ⊆ S
′
i
, {ai+1} = C(Si) and {ai} = C(S ′i).
By Theorem 2, C satisfies PKWARP. Hence, obviously, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1},
{ai+1} = C({ai, ai+1}). Let i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}. {ai+1} = C({ai, ai+1}) implies
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that (ai+1, ai) ∈ P1 or [(ai, ai+1), (ai+1, ai) /∈ P1 and (ai+1, ai) ∈ P2]. If
(ai+1, ai) ∈ P1, by definition, we cannot have {ai} = C(S ′i). Hence, ∀i ∈
{1, ..., n− 1}, (ai, ai+1), (ai+1, ai) /∈ P1 and (ai+1, ai) ∈ P2 which implies the
cyclicity of P2.
C PKSARP ∧ Expansion ; PKWARP ∧ Ex-
pansion
Let us have X = {a, b, c, d, e, f}. Let P1 and P2 be given by the following
graph.
a
d
b
c
e f
2
1
P1 be given by the dashed arrows. Hence, there is a dashed arrow from a
to b if and only if (a, b) ∈ P1. P2 be given by the plain arrows. Hence, there
is a plain arrow from a to b if and only if (a, b) ∈ P2. P1 and P2 given in
the graph above are such that M(M(S, P1), P2) is a choice function. Hence,
we define the choice function C such that ∀S ∈ X , C(S) = M(M(S, P1), P2).
By Theorem 2, C satisfies Expansion and PKWARP. Let us show that C
does not satisfy PKSARP. We have C({a, b}) = {a} and C({a, b, e}) = {b}
which by definition imply that (b, a) ∈ P r
C
. We have {b} = C({b, c}) and
{c} = C({b, c, f}) which by definition imply that (c, b) ∈ P r
C
. We have {c} =
C({c, d}) and {d} = C({a, c, d}) which by definition imply that (d, c) ∈ P r
C
.
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We have {d} = C({a, d}) and {a} = C({a, b, d}) which by definition imply
that (a, d) ∈ P ′2. Hence, C does not satisfy PKSARP.
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